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By Jeffrey D. Grynaviski

Political scientists have lengthy painted American electorate' dependence on partisan cues on the poll field as a discouraging outcome in their total lack of knowledge approximately politics. taking over this traditional knowledge, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative idea that electorate as an alternative depend upon those cues simply because get together model names offer credible information regarding how politicians are inclined to act in workplace, regardless of the weak point of formal occasion association within the usa. one of the very important empirical implications of his thought, which he conscientiously helps with rigorous info research, are that voter uncertainty a couple of party's factor positions varies with the extent of celebration harmony it indicates in executive, that get together personal tastes within the voters are most powerful one of the so much yes citizens, and that occasion model names have significant results for the electoral ideas of social gathering leaders and person applicants for workplace.

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Additional resources for Partisan Bonds: Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability

Sample text

They also know that a majority of districts prefer that policy be shifted away from M∗ toward R – in fact, any policy in the range between PL and PR would receive the support of voters in a majority of districts. It seems logical for this group of candidates to mutually agree to form a national party and to pledge themselves to support some platform between PL and PR so that they could secure a national majority. Furthermore, given that the candidates preferring R have secured an electoral advantage from forming a party, it is easy to imagine the candidates preferring L to follow suit – promising a platform less extreme than M∗ .

Aldrich 1995). For example, parties provide a potential solution to problems of social choice in legislatures (Schwartz 1977); parties provide economies of scale in the organization of election campaigns (Osborne and Tourky 2007); and parties provide office-seekers with brand names that reduce voters’ uncertainty about candidates’ issue positions and ideology (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Snyder and Ting 2002). Politicians, recognizing these and other potential benefits to themselves, therefore incur the costs of developing and maintaining partisan institutions.

Voters accept parties that promise non-centrist outcomes so long as their policy commitments are more moderate than the outcomes voters anticipate if too many citizencandidates unrestrained by party leaders capture office. Having identified the rationale for party government, the chapter then provides an explanation for how, by operating on the surety model, the benefits of party government might be realized in the United States despite the apparent weakness of partisan institutions in this country compared to that observed elsewhere in the world.

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